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In 1625, more than twenty years prior to the ending of the Thirty Years War with

the Treaty of Westphalia, Hugo Grotius wrote De Jure Belli-ac Pacis, outlining his

solutions for a troubled world. While the details and particularities of his ideas may not

be compatible with today's unsettled and transitory world, what he strove and quested for
is as applicable today as it was at the beginning of the modem state system. At the time

of Grotius, feudalism was being replaced by statist concerns, centering around territory

and a dual centralization of domestic authority and military power. The transitory period
of the early seventeenth century awashed itself in bloody wars between the defenders of

the old and the provocateurs of systematic change. The Grotian Quest sought to establish

a foundation of order by recognizing the realities of the emergent new order with its state
emphasis but also retain the traditional heritage of Christian spirituality, morality, and

legality. The nuances of the original Grotian solution - as opposed to the generalities of

his quest - may not be the foundation upon what the present turmoil needs to root itself

upon. In fact, the common Christian conscience upon which Grotius depended does not

even exist in today's contemporary world.1 However, the Grotian Quest must be

revived - some kind of systematic synthesis of the old framework of world order of

intellectual thought combined with the changing realities of today's world must be

developed. Intrigal to the development of a new framework for world order is the
question of how the role of leaders and leadership styles in general will affect the

successful completion of the quest. What types ofleaders and what kind ofleadership is
needed to guide the world through the transition from old to new? To answer this

question, the paper will analyze two prior periods of peace under the current Westphalian

system and discuss the leadership exhibited during those times. Also, world order

characteristics of those two periods which affected the leadership will be presented
1Faulk. Richard. The End of World Order: Essays on Normative lnlernational Relalions.
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983). pgs. 25-27.

Then, the United States wfli be offered as the wor]d's oniy realistic future leader, and the
U.S.'s role in the world, and how ihe c:rnerging trends and characteristics of the new

world will affect this role, will be discussed. Finally, the type of leadership needed to

complete the Grotian Quest, the Presidential Model, sums up the paper.

The United States role wilt be determined by its foreign policy. What shoutd he

the over-riding vision of this policy? The late Kenneth Boulding,, operating under the

assumption that anything that currently exists in the world is possib1e, proposed that
policy should make a deliberate and determined effort at the highest levels of

government to promote the concept of stable peace. Stable peace is a situation where

two parties-do not even consider war as a reasonable option in resolving disputes.

Currently, relations between Canada and the United States or the relationships bct.-veen
the Scandinavian countries could be described as operating under a stable peace. This

present�day reality can and should, according to Boulding, he expanded throughout the

world. 2 It should be noted, however, that stable peace does not mean a lack of conflict.

only that the settlement of any conflict through the process of war would be well across

the taboo line of all parties involved. 3 Boulding compares the world system to a piece of
chalk, where a disruption wouid be signified by the breaking of the chalk piece. This

disruption, war, occurs when either the strain of the system wa5 too grcat for the �halk to

handle, or the strength of the chalk itself was insufficient to prevent snapping under the

pressure applied. Proper policy would simultaneous attempt to reduce strains placed on

the system. as well as attempting to enhance the strength of the system to handle any such
strain. 4 The United States must seek to obtain its Grotian Quest with the objective of

stable peace throughout the world by developing a policy to help formulate and construct
2Boulding ) Kenneth. Stable Peace. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978)
pgs. 93-94.
3 ibid. pg.10.
4 ibid. pg. 48-49.

the structure of a new systematic framework while engaging in a balancing act that will
increase strengths and decrease strains as needed. Proper leadership is the key.
Prior Periods of Peace
On the eve of a new era, an era in which the U.S. would seek stable peace, it is
useful to look back in history to two periods of peace occurring under the auspices of the
Westphalian state system. An examination of why the relations between the major
powers of the time were relatively calm sheds light on possible strategies for the future.
While neither time period might be described as periods of stable peace, the stability
during these era was impressive.
The Hundred Years Peace, 1815-1914
Historian Karl Polyani wrote his work The Great Transformation during the
Second World War, a series of "wars of an unprecedented type in which scores of states
crashed, and the contours of new empires are emerging out of a sea of blood. "5 It was a
time where "demoniac violence is merely swiftly imposed on a swift, silent current of
change." 6 The Second World War ended a long period of peace between the Great
Powers of Europe - England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia. During the
entire century period, these powers were engaged in war with one another for a scant
eighteen months - as opposed to an average of sixty to seventy years for the preceding
two centuries. One might be quick to say that perhaps during this time the strength of the
Westphalian order merely did not have to endure any strains upon the system. In

, Karl. 17ie Great Transformation. (New York: Octagon Books, 1944). pg. 4.

5 Po)yani

6 ibid.

actuality, the period had much potential for turmoil. "fRlevolutionary and anti

revolutionary interventions were the order of the day" 7 during the first part of the period,

ranging from Spain, Hungary, the Germanys, Belgium, Poland, Switzerland, Denmark, to
Venice. The second portion of the period was marked by the disillusion of the Ottoman,
Egyptian, and Sheriffian empires as well as the forced opening of the Chinese nation.

Also during this time, the United States and Russia began to emerge as world powers.
Throughout all this, armed conflict occurred, but only between the Great Powers and
lesser countries - never actually between the Great Powers themselves. 8

Po)yani observed three major reasons for the upholding of peace between the

Great Powers during this time: balance of power, the emergence of a "peace interest,"
and the power of a haute finance. The balance of power system developed ,vith the

signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, some seventy-five years after the state-system came into

being with the Treaty of Westphalia. Within this system, nation-states acted in a way in
which no one actor could dominate the continent by combining the power of several

weaker states to offset a stronger power. Thus, those states involved in the system were

assured of survival through the medium of war. However, in past instances, such as the

Greek and Italian city-states or the European Great Powers right after the signing of

Westphalia, balance of power lead to the survival of the sovereignty of participating

states through a series of war-like behavior. During the Hundred Years Peace, balance of

power caused on avoidance of war. The added factor was the development of a peace

interest. This new peace interest found proponents in those who were threatened by the

prospect of war, namely those in patrimonial positions susceptible to the rise of

patriotism caused by the French Revolution. First, the Holy Alliance became the

defender of peace over liberty, followed by the emergence of the Concert of Europe in
7ibid. pg. 5.
8ibid. pgs. 5-6.

the second portion of the century. However, while the Holy Alliance had the support of
b<lth thf' �ri.;:tf\f.'racy and CJmrcl:i., the- Crinr-e-:rt of E!.:!:r(\.pe., .at best.,. rouJd tte caJ.lt"d .a J(\DSf"
confederation, lacking feudal and clerical aspects. How did the Concert manage to keep
the peace as well as the Alliance, without having the advantage of the church•state
union? The answer lies in the final piece of the puzzle, the influence of haule finance.
This factor was the main link between the political and economic organization of the
period, supplying the instruments for the international p�ace. The international banking
system .. whose person�l consisted of families like the Rothschilds, were independent of
any one government and held loyalty only to a firm. While they had made their money
through the financing of wars, and they did not object to minor, localized wars, a general
war between the Great Powers would interfere with the monetary foundations of the
international system. Upholding peace was not the primary goal of the hautejinance,
gain was, and peace made gain possible. The balance of power system, combined with
the elites' peace interest, and driven by the haute finance, came together to support and
uphold the Hundred Years Peace. The death kneH of this period, however, came upon
the joining toe;eth!:':r of the Triplf� Alli�nr.e ofG-ennany_ Austria-Hungary, ancl Italy, anci
the ultimate counter-alliance of England, France, and Russia. The end of balance of
power, combined with Germany's acceptance of the gold standard, thus starting the era of
protectionism and colonial expansion, overcame the hautejinance�,; ability to avert war.
The War to End All Wars soon followed.9

American Leadership During the Hundred Year's Peace
During the Hundred Year's Peace, as indicative of most of the nineteenth century,
the United State's involved itse1flittle in world affairs. This isolationist forei gn policy
9 ibid. pgs. 6-19.

was rationalized as being consistent 1,,vith national interest in that any global involvement

would adversely affect democracy at home. The Presidential roots of isolationism stem
from George Washington's Farewell Address, which advised and warned against the

United State's involving itself with any permanent alliances \vith any portion of the

worid. This view saw the participation in balance of power politics with the non

democratic, despotic European governments as dangerous due to the potential for the

United States to be drnwn tiitO a foreign conflict in which the U.S. had no ieal internsts.
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possible loss of democratil..'. freedoms at home, implying involvement with corrupt

governments would warp the nation's own democratic system. 10 The epitome of the

American mindset during this period came under President Monroe, when his Secretary

of State, and future President John Quincy Adams delivered a speech in 1821 describing

the role of the U.S. in world affairs:

"Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be
unfurled, there will [America's] heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But
she does not go ahroad in search of monsters to destroy . She is the well-wisher
to the freedom and independence of aH. She is the champion and vindicator of
hor 0""'
,.,..ll ..,.,.om...-.onrl 1-he 6"'
"""n"'ral cause b)' the CO"ntenanc o+'he-- ,,,..;,.,,,
and by the benignant sympathy of her example... [Otherwise] she might become
the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.'' 11
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This mentality, combined ,...ith the domestic implications and problems in America

throughout the century (such as the Civil War and Reconstruction) limited the United
States' leadership role in international affairs to as bare a minimum as possible. The

President of the United States was merely that, avoiding international leaderships, except
where it involved the direct defense of the U.S. against other's predatory actions.12

10Kegley, Chaires W. and Eugene Wittkopf American Foreign Policy. (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1991). pgs. 34-35.
1 ibid. pg. 34.
12ibid.

The lonR Peace
The second period of relative peace between the Great Powers of the day under
the Westphalian system occurred during the 11 Cold War" between the United States and
the Soviet Union after World War IL John Lewis Gaddis has analyzed this period,
calling it the ' 1 Long Peace," indicating the lack of armed conflict between Great Powers
during the time. In the chapter !!Great Illusions, the Long Peace, and the Future," in his
work The United States and the End of the Cold War, Gaddis indicates five factors that

contributed to the relative peace of the period. One factor, although certainly not the
lone one or even the predominate one, was the presence of nuclear weapons. These
weapons, far surpassing any destructive capacity of any weapon in human history,

enabled politicians to know the outcome of a war using these weapons without actually
engaging in one. Mutually assured destruction prevented either side during the Cold War
from actually using these weapons, despite the occasion saber-rattling. Another factor,
bipolarity, is closely linked with the presence of nuclear weapons, since it is difficult to
separate the two factors as the two major nuclear powers comprised the bi polar nature of
the world. However, one can say that nuclear weapons had nothing to do with the
emergence of bipolarity, since a bipolar system would have World War TI regardless of
the development of the weapons of mass destruction. The length of time bipolarity
survived is considerable, and may be attributed to the combined factor of nuclear
weapons. The symbolism of nuclear weapons in providing "great power status" did
provide for the appearance of bipolarity we1l into the l980's, despite the lack of bipolarity
in non-military spheres - for instance, the actual triangular, multipolar economic realm
with the U.S., Japan, and Europe emerging as the dominate powers. So, the twin-factors
of nuclear weapons and biploarity combine to provide a strong reason why peace
prevailed during the Cold War.

The third factor offered up by Gaddis is one of hegemonic stability, particularly in

the economic realm. This factor is due to the a single hegemonic power, in this case the

U.S., dedicated to upholding a system incorporating rules promoting a liberal economic

order, meaning one based on minimizing barriers to trade and investment across

international borders. A vital part of this theory is the hegomonic power achieving

legjtimacy in its rei_gn, which is why the Soviet Union could not be considered the sole

hegomonic power. Hegemonic stability can be linked with the two prior reasons in that

the U.S. may not have risen to the leadership role without the immediate threat of the
Soviet Union. For instance, the U.S. could have achieved this hegomonic stability

between the world wars, but the lack of a clear and present enemy failed to motivate the
U.S. to rise to this rok Linked to this hegomonic preponderance by the U.S. is the

fourth reason for the Long Peace, the triumph ofliberalism. The abrupt end of the Cold
War in 1989 suggests that this triumph is sudden and complete and the importance of

economic over military power, the advantages of lateral over hierarchical organization,
and the declining utility ofrepression and terror cannot be over-stated. The world's

democratic political order rest upon the foundation of three factors of its own: the

obsolescence of great power war, the increased permeability of borders, and the failure of
command economies. War is now considered an exceptional event by Great Powers, and
war behveen Great Powers is almost not even a possibility. This is not to say that we

have entered an era of stable peace, as the eight year Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 Gulf

War proves_ Borders are no longer a barrier to other cultures, technologies, ideologies, or

trade. Satellites prevent the concealment of many events within a nation-states own

borders, as well as the simple movement of troops. The failure of command economies

have legitimized the fact that free and open economies are a better alternative, and there
seems to he a link between collapsing command economies and the increase in

democracy. 13 These three factors appear to support Francis Fukuyama's assertion that
the fundamental change which occurred in 1989 was the "total exhaustion of viable

systematic alternatives to Western liberalism "14

The final factor put forth by Gaddis in support of why there existed the Long

Peace after World War II is his Long Cycle Theory. The cycle of history brings forth a

Great Power, hegemonic war every one hundred to one-hundred and fifty years. The

post-war period is characterized by the rise of a dominant leader, a phase followed by the

eventual delegitimization of that leader, further followed by a decentralization of power

through the system, bring the cycle full circle to war. The recent Long Peace, then, was

just a nature phase in the cycle of history, and we are currently moving into the

"delegitmization" of the post-war leader, the United States. The cycle theorists seem to

agree that the cause of the cycle is a disparagement rate of economic and technological

development, causing states growing in power to chatlenge the system. The great

question, of course, is whether or not the cycle can be broken. W111 nuclear weapons
prevent another Great War? Has the triumph ofliberalism and the current hegominc

stability slowed the economic divisions? And perhaps of most immediate importance, if

economic grow-th has been accelerated, will this shorten the time hegemons stay in
power, thus shortening the phases of the historical cycle? 15

John Lewis. The United States and the End af the Cold War: Implications,
Reconsiderations, Provocations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
pg. 168-186.
14 ibid. pg. 180.
15 ibid. pgs.186- I 90.

13 Gaddis,

American Leadership during the Long Peace

How did the Long Peace affect the nature of ]eadership during the period? The
Second World War "revealed, encouraged, and catalyzed several trends which did much
to shape the post-war role and policies of the United States."16 These trends, including
"the colJapse of the balance of power in Europe, the emergence of a bipolar international
system in which two great powers shared a profound ideological antipathy towards one
another, the development of nuclear weapons and the decolonisation process all had far
reaching implications for American policy and with it the role of the presidency."17 The
leader of the United States became the leader of the free world against the Soviet Union,
and, as such, caused the president to evolve and develop into three distinct roles. These
roles - the president as "Cold Warrior," the president as Peacekeeper, and the president as
the Chief Decision-maker - had consistent characteristics throughout all of the modern
presidencies, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Reagan. The correspondence between the
modern presidencies and the Long Peace allows an analysis of leadership characteristics
within the Long Peace period.
The role of "Cold Warrior" was one where the president defined the national
interest and identified major challenges and threats to the security of the nation.
However, this role also lent itself to each president defining the national interest as
synonymous with the own individual's political interests. Situations which merely
challenged the nation were suddenly perceived as a threat merely because the challenged
and question the president1s own strength, resolve, and determination. The president,
having perverted national interest's to coincide with his own personal issues, thus became
the reflection of the nation's own machismo. The development of this machismo can be
16Williams. Phil. "The President and Foreign Relations." In The Modern Presidency.
alcolm Shaw, Ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1987). pg. 207.

17;h;d.

traced to diverse foundations such as the American culture's emphasis on competitive
individualism to the "Munich syndrome," where the American public and leadership
were extremely sensitive to any perception of appeasement towards the Soviet Union. It
was felt any si gn of weakness or of giving in would only encourage aggressive.
Furthermore, domestic pressures only strengthened the perceived need to project strength
and toughness. Issues such as the "sellout" at Yalta and Potsdam or the question of "who
lost China" only caused Presidents to enforce their machismo. Incidents of machismo are
found throughout all the post-war Presidents. Truman engaged in the Korean War,
Eisenhower's Secretary of State Dulles spoke of brinkmanship and massive retaliation,
while Kennedy attempted to recover from the Bay of Pigs by being tough during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Johnson intervened in the Dominican Republic to prevent a
second Cuba, and he also escalated the Vietnam War, leading to such machnistic policies
as the Domino Theory. Nixon, while being a major player in the game of detente, still
had to first show his political will and toughness by invading Cambodia and mining
Haiphong harbor. Ford, through Henry Kissinger, sought to challenge Soviet intervention
in Angola. solely to try to restore American credibility after Vietnam and to show the
Soviets they could not easily meddle in the Third World. Carter was very much against
American intervention abroad, making him have the potential to be strikingly different
than the other modern presidents. In fact, with the exception of the Iranian hostage crisis,
Carter did manage to avoid military entanglements abroad. However, despite Carter's
desire to avoid a hard-lined stance in world affairs, domestic pressures forced him to lean
in tat direction even before the Soviet invasion of Afganistan. A hawkish Senate,
combined with an American public who felt Carter was doing too little, too late with
regards to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afganistan, doomed the President to a image of
weakness. This image was due not only because the nation felt Carter's policies short�
changed American power, but also because the public saw Carter's personality as being
weak. While Carter's politics may have moved to a tougher stance in response to the

domestic pressures, his personality remained constant, lacking any of the macho ism
expected by a Cold War public. Americans felt Carter's failure to project a strong image
lead to the humiliation of the Iran hostage situation, and the president's failed attempt at a

macho rescue attempt was viewed as a near invitation for the Soviets' Afganistan
invasion. The election of Reagan, perhaps the last true "Cold Warrior," was a direct
result of the "Iran syndrome" and Soviet aggression. Reagan was the public's
reaffirmation of the machoistic quality it desired in the modem Presidency and a
rejection of the Carter mentality and leadership. Grenada, Lebanon, and Libya were
direct targets of Reagan's own machismo, as expressed through the role of "Cold
Warrior."
The second leadership role of the President during the Long Peace was one of
peacekeeper. Conflict resolution was a main consideration of alt post-war Presidents,
contrasting ironically with the "Cold Warrior" mentality of the day. Crisis-management
during the Cold War always had a high degree of personal and sustained involvement of
the President, especially when such conflicts potentially involved the Soviet Union.
Truman's personal style of leadership set the precedent that the President was at the apex
of the decision-making process during different crises, but the model was continued
under subsequent Presidents. For instance, Eisenhower allowed Secretary of State Du11es
great leeway in the day-to-day running of foreign policy, but was much more involved
and assertive when situations involved China or the Soviets. Kennedy was explicit in his
instructions to the Navy in the implementation of the blockade on Cuba, seeking to make
sure the U.S. did not cross the line between coercive behavior and war-like tactics. This
highly personal approach by the President to issues concerning the Soviets lead to an
actual higher degree of sensitivity to the Soviet position on any matter_ The President
tended to view situation from a point of view which sought to understand how the
scenario was affecting his Soviet counter-part. This empathy and attempted
understanding lead the desire for greater communications between the superpowers in

order to avoid war through misunderstanding. The Washjngton-Moscow hotline was

installed soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis for just this reason. As Presidents began to

relate more directly with their Soviet equivalent, it was only natural that the peacekeeper
role of the President would seek to establish direct contact between the two leaders.

Summitry, while rarely providing break-throughs on serious issues, became a symbolic,
psychological way to reassure Presidents, from Eisenhower in 1955 to Reagan and

Gorbachev in 1985. Peacekeeping caused the emergence of direct dialogues between
hostile powers, thus providing a significant step forward in improving relations.

The third and final role played by the President during the Long Peace was that of

Chief Decision-Maker. Legislation following the Second World War, including the

Executive Reorganization Act of 1939 and the National Security Act of 194 7, lead to an

increased White House staff and the development of the Central Intelligence Agency, the

National Security Council (NSC), and a unified Department of Defense. These

provisions were created in order to better inform the President on foreign affairs, but they

also were seen as a way in which to limit the Presidential power by institutionalizing his
relationship with the Executive branch. Conversely, however, these evolutions actually

strengthened the power of Presidents in the realm of foreign policy due to the high degree
of flexibility given to the President in determining the use of institutions like the National
Security Council. Beginning with Truman, the NSC's advisory role was emphasized, and

Eisenhower relied more on Dulles than the Council. Kennedy actually used the NSC to
provide him access to new ideas within the Executive branch, although the President

worked outside the NSC. Johnson avoided the formal role of the NSC, that of advising,

by listening to a small group of advisors outside the Council. However, Johnson allowed

the Council to be transformed in that its head, the National Security Advisor (NSA),
began shielding the President of criticism of the Vietnam War emerging out of the

Executive Branch. The NSA instead began to assure the President of the rightness of

escalation, thus moving the position away from a neutral manager of opinions to an

activist advocate of the President's position. Under Nixon, Kissinger's stint as NSA
furthered this trend, cumulating in Kissinger's formal appointment as Secretary of State.
Under the next two Presidents, Carter and Reagan, a reversion to the neutral manager by
the NSA seems to have taken place. Carter was very aware of the criticism of the Nixon
method, while Reagan may have enjoyed this return to neutrality simply due to the fact
that the NSA position was held by three different individuals in quick succession. The
significance of the way in which the modem presidents have used the NSC is the
evolution of the President as Chief Decision-Maker. These differences between
presidents in their use of the NSC only underscores how much the individual preferences
and styles of each president affected the process, and sometimes, the outcome of foreign
policy. While the NSC was originally intended to diffuse the decision-making process,
the presence of a highly trusted individual in the Executive Branch, from Secretary of
State Acheson under Truman to Dulles under Eisenhower to Kissinger under Nixon,
tended to centralize the process into one figure, with the President being the ultimate
decision-maker after that one person. Allowing this to occur was a dangerous game for
the President. While Dulles may have superbly handled foreign affairs without quelling
the advisory nature of the NSC towards the president, a strong figure like NSA Walter
Rostow limited the flow of information to Johnson and, thus, hindering the leadership of
the President. When there was no prominent figure, the President tended to work outside
the NSC, using the Council only as a sounding board, while the decisions on foreign
policy was ultimately made solely by the President. This approach seemingly made the
NSC more neutral politically, allowing the President to be informed of a wide-range of
options in foreign policy. The level of use of the NSC by the President seems to
reinforce the particularities of each individual President. For example, Eisenhower did
not wish to pursue a active foreign policy, and his consensus-building approach within
the NSC only caused his foreign policy to be even more time-consuming and, thus,

inactive in nature. Johnson's reliance of a small group of individuals who tended to
mirror his views, rather than using the entire NSC, only escalated his policy rigidity.
The three roles of the President - "Cold Warrior," Peacekeeper, and Chief
Decision-Maker - combined to make the leadership exhibited during the Long Peace
highly centered on the President of the United States. A strong President, meaning one
who is at the apex of the decision-making process and who displays machois tic
tendencies to keep the peace, has come to be seen as key to the future survival of the
United States. 18 The question now is whether or not, during this transition phase of the
world framework 1 this type of leadership is stil1 needed or desirable.
Why the United States?

If the world is poised at a time in history where the system which has guided the
international order is transiting into an as yet unformulated framework, why must it be
the United States that takes on the role of helping to define the new order? And if it is
the United States' responsibility, how should the nation go about leading the world on the
Grotian Quest? Is it an option for U.S. foreign policy to avoid addressing world issues
and to simply concentrate on domestic problems? Or maybe, even if the United States
wanted to be the leader on the world stage, perhaps it lacks the power or the legitimacy to
do so. Despite all these assertions, the United States is the only nation-state in the world
capable of leading the community of nations forward to a framework different than the
Westphalian system as expressed by the Cold War. Furthermore, it is America's best self
interest to be the leader, rather than begging off and allowing some other actor to lead.

18 ihid.

pg. 36.

As stated by the U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, "It is now a cliche that
America is the world's only superpower."19 But what exactly does this mean? The
United States is the only contender for world leadership still strong in all areas of power.
Tangible sources of power include basic resources, military capacity, economic
resources, and scientific and technological development. These are the traditional;
quantitative measures of how powerful a nation is in ten11s of natural resources.
Intangible sources of power includes national cohesion, universalistic culture, and
influence within international institutions. These power bases are less traditional and
more qualitative, measuring perceptions towards the nation in question.

Snnrr-P nf Pnwpr

Tangible

Basic resources
Military
Economic
Science/technology

lntanKihle

Power Resources of the Major Contender,., 1990
U.S.

Soviet Union

Europe

Japan

China

strong
strong
strong
strong

strong
strong

strong

strong

strong
strong

medium
weak

strong
strong

weak

strong

strong

medium
medium

National cohesion
strong
medium
g
Universalistic culture stron
medium
International institutions strong
medium

* Sources of weakness italici:::eflO

medium

strone
strong

mt>rhum
medium

medium
medium
weak

medium
medium

As seen in Joseph Nye, Jr. 's table, the other four major world powers - the Soviet

Union (now Russia), the state� of Europe, Japan, and China - all have at !east one major
deficiency in the traditional areas of power. For example, the United States is stronger
than China in the area of "universalistic culture," meaning the American culture prevails

19Dole, Bob. "Shaping Americ's Global Future." Fure(ltn Policy. Spring 1995.
Number 98. pg. 29.
20Nye, Joseph S. Jr. Hound to Lead: 1he Changing Nature <fAmerican Power. (New
,
York: Basic Books > 1990). pg. 174.

and influences more individuals and countries throughout the world than does Chinese
culture. 21 The power relation between the two countries in this area forces China to
attempt to "inoculate China's intellectua1s and urban youth against the subversive cultural
intl uence of the United States. "22 The Tianamen Square massacre of student protesters,
who were almost universally supported by the populace of urban Beijing,23 only pushed
China into a resistance of "Western cultural 'pressure"' . 24 The reverse, however, is not
true - the prospect of the Chinese culture overtaking America does not seem to be a
either a national security threat or an eminent possibility. The strength of the United
States' universalistic culture affects China, but the relative weakness of Chinese culture
does not challenge the U.S. However, the American leadership must always take into
effect how the U.S. 's universalistic culture is affected the leadership of others. For
i.nstance, China's Deng Xiaoping's open door policy and wishes for faster economic
reform are beneficial to the United States. Yet. the very same culture that provides the
U.S. with power. also provides Deng's opposition a rallying cry against the "spiritual
po11ution" and "bourgeois liberalization" caused by the West.25 In order for the Chinese
leadership to survive, they must down-play the Western links associated with reform. If
the very Jeadership the U.S. pursues emphasizes these associations, Chinese domestic
pressures and foreign policy will once again link together as they did with the Tianeman
21 ibid. pg. 173.
Steven I. "Sino_american Realtions: Testing the Limits." In China and the
World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. Samuel S. Kim,
Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). pg. 82.
23 Seymour, James D. Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations. In China and the
World: Chinese Foreign Relations in !he Post-Cold War Era. Samuel S. Kim,
Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). pg. 219.
24Robinson, Thomas W. "Interdependence in China's Foreign Relations." [n China and
the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War l:.:ra. Samuel S. Kim,
Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). pg. 190.
25 Whiting, Allen S. "The Future of Chinese Policy. In China and the World: Chinese
Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War J-,,'ra. Samuel S. Kim, Ed. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994). pg. 259.
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Square massacre. In China, part of the domestic agenda of Deng include the securing of
an appropriate successor who will continue with his economic reforms. To do this, a
nationalistic stance is necessary in order to fight against Deng's domestic, conservative
opposition. Blatant provocation by the American leadership, such as the sale ofF-16's to
Taiwan,26 can always be stopped, but the universalistic culture projected by the U.S. is
not so easy to control.
Another example is the power relationship between Japan and the United States.
While there is the perception that Japan has over-taken the U.S. i.n the power sphere of
economics, or, at the very least, has drawn even with America, it must be remember that
this Japanese economic challenge has been supported by the United States' security
guarantees to Japan. The U.S.'s strong military allows the United States to offer such
security umbrellas to allies, and Japan is well-aware that while it may compete with the
U.S. on economic terms, the U.S. holds the trump card of military protection. The
leadership question, of course, is how much can the U.S. threaten to remove this
protection without serious consequences? Japan has the capacity to go nuclear, but does
not because of its own domestic taboo against it. Yet, if the U.S. suddenly pulls Japan's
military security guarantee, it is conceivable Japan's taboo against nuclear weapons
would disintegrate in the face of national security tears. The affect of a nuclear Japan
upon North Korea and China would be tremendous. Fortunately, current thought in
Japan seems to point away from a nuclear force, with the one caveat that the nation may
pursue nuclear weapons if the United States ever abandoned them. 27 This leaves the
U.S. with the leadership challenge of having the power leverage against Japan through
the providing of that nation's security, yet not begin able to ever seriously consider fully
following through on any threat to remove this security guarantee.
26 ibid. pg. 269.
27Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Bound to Lead: 11ie Changing Nature qfAmerican Power. (New
York: Basic Books, 1990). pgs. 158-162.

It is important to note, however, that the United States does not have a
preponderance of power in any one of the spheres of power listed in Nye's table.
American power comes from the breadth of American influence across the spheres, not
from its depth in any one area. The United States is not a hegomonic power, meaning it
can not dominate and control each section of power. Furthermore, the very nature of
power itself is changing, making the completion of the Grotian Quest even more difficult.
This change makes it difficult for leaders who are confined to thinking of power in
traditional ways. How leaders achieve goals must be re-evaluated. In the current
transition period, power has become less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible in
nature. Power being less fungible means a nation-state is less able to transfer its power in
one area to affect desired outcomes in another sphere. For instance, no longer is it the
case where a power can use its military might to conquer new territory for economic
gain. In reverse, a state like Japan is restrained from converting its economic power into
military strength. Despite this reduced fungibility of power, it is incorrect to say that
military power has lost all of its transferability. The United States remains the ultimate
protector of Europe and Japan, and this does become a power resource. While the U.S.
voluntarily gave up some of its economic advantages by redistributing resources among
its allies during the Cold War, the decrease in the potential Russian threat only enhances
U.S. economic power. Yet, since the threat to Europe or Japan is not entirely gone, the
U.S. retains some advantage by being these regions' protector. Reduced fungibilty helps
the United States since only the U.S. is powerful across spheres, and the remaining
fungibility of military resources continues to assist in America's influence, as it did
during the Cold War. Furthermore, with the increased. economic interdependence
between nation-states, the coercive nature of power has lessened in that the costs
associated with the use of force has sky-rocketed. The benefits of economic relations
move in both directions between states, and the threat of force by one nation must always
undergo a cost-assessment as to the trade-offs between the use of force and the loss of

economic relations. Non-coercive power is a cooptive type of power, including such
factors as ideology, culture, the principle authority over multinational corporations, and
language. Cooptive power is the ability of a nation to structure the situation in such a
way that other states develop preferences and define their own interests in the same way
as the cooptive power. Finally, power is less tangible, meaning forces such as culture
have become more influential on the world stage. No longer can power be discussed
solely in terms of size of armies and amounts of resources. Factors listed in Nye's table
(national cohesion, universalistic culture, and participation in international organizations)
are increasingly important as they allow a nation to base their power more of information
than resources. Acting on new information or the development of new technology
depends upon intangible factors.
These three factors concerning the changing nature of power will have a profound
affect on who leads the world into the new order. After evaluating their power resources,
leaders will now have to ask the question "Power for what?" Furthermore, how a leader
uses the power of the nation is more complex, meaning the use of power in one area will
most certainly affect relations in another. Mi1itary power against a state will affect the
economic power relations with that state and others , as Iraq saw when it invaded Kuwait.
Because of the changing nature of power in the world, it is unlikely that any country will
become a dominant hegemonic power. However, only the United States is strong it\all
the different areas of power, and, while it may be challenged and even bettered in any
one power area, the U.S.'s breadth of power allows it to be an active force in all areas. 28
The term "superpower" no longer connotes absolute power, it merely indicates power
strength in many areas. In this respect, Bob Dole is correct, the U.S. alone deserves the
title. And from this title rightly springs William Satire's assertion that "Global heavy
thinkers are not arguing about withdrawing from our duty to keep the world in order.
28;bid pgs.188-l 98.

The real battle is about the way we go about doing it. " 29 The leadership needed for this
battle will depend upon the emerging characteristics of the new world, combined with a
discussion of the possible roles for the United States.

Emerging Trends for World Order: A Transitory Period

Before one can begin to examine the United States' possible role in the new order
of the world, an examination of what this new order may look like would be useful. In
late 1.993, with issues like Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia in the news, President Bill Clinton
defended his administration's handling of foreign policy by stating: "We do the best we
can without some quick and easy theories like containment. "30 His statement implies the
present day world is much more complicated than in years past, and, in this transitory
"deregulation era" where there are numerous new actors with new capabilities operating
under precious few new rules, his implication is fairly accurate. 31 The coming order will
be difficult to pin down under one conceptual buzz-word. A single all encompassing
paradigm dominating all areas of foreign policy thought and action will not emerge to
intellectually cover the new world order. 32 Its characteristics will be a cross of many
differing traits of past eras. The successful completion by the U.S. of the new Grotian
Quest of melding the past with the present to obtain a workable future depends on the
United States willingness to work within many different spheres of characteristics.
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31 Haas, Richard N. "Paradigm Lost." Fore in .Af]airs. January/February 1995. Volume
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Looking back upon the previous examination of the two prior era of relative

peace under the Westphalian system, we see some similarities between the reasons

behind the long periods of peace. We also see, however, diametrically opposite reasons
for peace. While both periods were supported by economic peace interests (Polyani's

haute finance and Gaddis' economic hegemon), the Hundred Year's Peace politically
depended on the multi-polar balance of power, while the Long Peace depended on

bipolarity. Furthermore, both periods had a " peace interest", but of differing natures.
The Hundred Year's Peace interest derived form the fear of those in power of being

overthrown by wars of patriotism. The Long Peace's "peace interest" was twofold. First,
the nuclear weapons made the utility of peace greater than the utility of war between the

two great nuclear powers, the U.S. and Russia. Combined with the nuclear threat, the

triumph ofliberalism, as opposed to the suppression of liberty in the Hundred Year's

Peace, stressed the important of peace. It is important to sort through these reasons in

order to determine whether or not the similarities between the two periods will again
exist in the new world order. Furthermore. when there are opposing system factors

between the two periods, it would be useful in determining period aspect will most help
the new world obtain stability.

The haute finance of the Hundred Year's Peace and the economic hegemony of

the Long Peace will continue into any future world model, and their importance will

guide the United States through the transition period to this new order. As President

Clinton has stated: "The currency of national strength in this new era will be

denominated not only in ships and tanks and planes, but in diplomas and patents and

paychecks. "33 The economic sphere will be the area in which the United States will

shore up past successes in other spheres. For example, in the military circle, the U.S.
33Clarke, Jonathan. "The Conceptiual Poverty of U.S. Foreign Policy." The Atlantic
Monthly. September 1993. pg. 62.

out-lasted the Soviet Union and won the Cold War. However, a return to

authoritarianism becomes more and more likely as people are unable to put food on the

table in Eastern Europe and Russia. Furthermore, issues such as Islamic fundamentalism,

terrorism, and nuclear proliferation can all be linked with economics. Fundamentalists
are traditionally found among the poor, who reach out to the extreme in an attempt to

better their lives. in Peru, terrorist groups indigenous to the nation spring forth out of a
populace's dissatisfaction with their political process, which in tum is saddled by

economic problems. Nuclear weapons were flaunted by the Ukraine in protests over the

lack of aid and attention by the G-7 countries. And finally, Indian Hindus scapegoat their

Muslim neighbors in part due to that nation's chronic underperformance in the economic
sphere. All these problems are made exceedingly more difficult when the economic

aspect of their causes are ignored. 34 The power of hautefinance and the influence of

the economic hegemon, the United States, can come together to help contain and resolve
these problems during this transitory period of world order.

One of the most predominate questions concerning the future is whether the

world order system will return to a classical multi polar situation now that the bipolar
Cold \Var has ended. It is easy to fall into the false dilemma that the world must

necessarily conform into either a bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar world. The world will
not predominately be any of the three� it will have characteristics of all. Some contend

the Soviet Union will be unable to continue on the road of democracy and will eventually

return to the evil empire of the past, thus providing a continuance of the bipolar world.
This is not a realistic possibility because, even if there was a radical return to the past

within the Russian leadership, the Russians would still be extraordinarily far behind in
the information revolution and the development of an information-based economy. A

Soviet-resurgence would be based upon the same principles which caused the nation to

34;hid. pg. 66.

fall behind in the first place, and the failure to address these concerns would cause any

potential conservative threat to be short lived at best. The problems of Russia were

caused by systematic and fundamental problems in the Soviet political economy. A

return to such a mentality could not then solve the problems it caused and would collapse
again under its own philosophical shortcomings.

Since the Soviet Union is not returning to the world stage, it is tempting then to

merely agree with the assessment that the I 990's will bring a return to muhipolarity, with

the United States, Russia, China, India, Europe, and Japan becoming the balancing

powers of the period. Unfortunately, this assertion ignores the fact that the classical

balance of power situation, as found in Europe during the Hundred Year's Peace, resulted

from the balancing of coercive power, while the present period, with its rise of different
powers, is due to a dispersal of the same coercive power. There is a confusion between

calling the emerging situation multi polar by arguing the diffusion of power is the cause
and the reality of what the term multi polar means. Multipolarity implies a scenario

where there exists a number of actors of relatively equal power who are able and willing

to shift alliances frequently to maintain the equilibrium. As indicated by Nye's table

above, the power relations between power contenders are not necessarily equal in the

classic military sense. Furthermore, the ability and willingness to shift alliances with the
current nuclear considerations is doubtful. Japan abandoning its American alliance and

forging ahead with its own nuclear development would not be worth the scare to China
for any of the three actors involved. In a strictly military sense, the world will remain

basically bipolar, with the predominance of nuclear power remaining with the United

States and Russia. Multipolarity is more possible in the economic sphere, but the U.S.

still remains strong compared to other contenders. 35

35Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nalure r?f'American Power. (New
York: Basic Books, 1990). pgs. 233-236.

The American Role

One of the few points of commonalties among the current debates on foreign

policy is that the United States must involved itself in world affairs. However,

disagreement is rampant on how we go about immersing ourselves on the world stage.

The differing schools - the unilateralists and the multilateralists - diametrically oppose

one another. The unilateralists assert we should choose our battles and assert our

leadership by inspiring, pressuring, and expecting our allies to follow our lead. The

multilateralists believe in concerted action with international organizations like the

United Nations or NAT0.36 In the United States government, unilateralists find a home
with the Republican Party, while the administration and the Democratic Party are

multilateralists. These viewpoints can clearly be seen in statements given by both sides

in two extraordinary articles published in the current edition of Foreign Policy.

Speaking for the Republican Party, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole discusses the post

World War II scene, where the United States "rose to the challenge of winning the peace

through American leadership. New multilateral institutions were established... but they
were insufficient. What made the difference was American will and oower... "37 Dole

goes on to state it was "American leadership and commitment - supported by our a11ies

throughout the world - that led to the overwhelming victories in the Cold War. "38 His

opinions of intemati.onal organizations do not improve throughout his article, stating that
such organizations "will, at best, practice pohcymaking at the lowest common

denominator - finding a course that is the least objectionable to the most members "39
36Safire William. "The Question is How U.S. lnt1uences World, Not ff" Richmond
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This type of policy, in Dole's view, cannot and will not defend America's .interests. The
opposing article was written by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and represented
the administration's and the rnultilateralist view of the world. Christopher states that
"American leadership...requires that we galvanize the support of allies, friends, and
international institutions," 40 and the unilateralist view is naive because it "limits our
flexibility, weakens our influence, and harms our interests." 41 In this transitory world,
Christopher contends the United States cannot "build a more secure and prosperous
world by ourselves. " 42
Stemming out of this debate between the two schools comes a vast array of
suggestions for both the defining of American interests and iterating the United States'
role in the world. These suggestions come from either extreme of the unilateral
multilateral debate, as well as from the middle. On the unilateralists side, roles tend to
fall into the concept of minimalism, which avoids embracing any foreign policy goals.
This view sees the United States in decline because of the costs of decades of
involvement in the international realm. They demand a shift of resources to the domestic
realm. 43 Minimalists would force a return to the leadership exhibited by the United
States in the Hundred Year's Peace - the Monrovian "lead by example" style. On the
other extreme, far reaches of the multilateralist school seek to define American interests
as challenged by the over-riding threat of chaos in the world. Chaos theories define
disorder as caused by environmental damage, overpopulation, poverty, refuge flows,
ethnic conflict, and failed states. 44 Defining a the broadly-defined term of chaos as a
4 °Christopher,
41 ibid.
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threat to the United States would force American leadership back into a neo-Cold War
mentality, where tough images, peacekeeping (or creating order out of chaos), and
decision-making would return to play a pivotal role. Neither extreme completes the
Grotian Quest, as both merely apply old ways of thought to new-world problems, rather
than seeking to synthesis the two.
Perhaps the best role that has emerged from somewhere in the middle of the two
schoo]s of thought is Alberto R. CoJl's "Grand Facilitator" role for the United States. Coll
acknowledges the world of the I 990's "wi 11 not be safer in all respects or require less
attention than that of the Cold War years. " 45 He notes the many new "opportunities for
multilateral cooperation," 46 but indicates that economic competition between the U.S.
and its allies will create "political dangers,"47 promoting industrial powers to cut side
deals which will be difficult for the U.S. to manage through intemati.onal institutions. 48
Coll further splits the two schools of thought in terms of the United States military role,
which would be one of a global power balancer. As the balancer of power, the U.S.
would seek to maintain regional balances of power, either through the assistance of
friendly allies in the particular area, or unilaterally if no ally is available.49
Unfortunately, this concept is what prevents the Grand Facilitator Model from being
useful in this transitory stage because, again, this type of military intervention relies
heavily on Cold War thinking, thus limiting American leadership to a by-gone mode of
thought. Also, with the recent Congressional elections, it is extraordinarily doubtful that
there would exist domestic support for this level of interaction.
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The Map for the Grotian Quest: The Pre..,idential Model for American Leadership
What is need in today's transitory world is a model for leadership that allows for
the complexities of a changing world. Many of the roles and models proposed in the
current foreign affairs 1iterature are too limiting in that they address only one sphere of
influence in which the United States must engaged. For instance, the Grand Facilitator
Theory is based upon the mi I itary concept tat the U.S. act as a balancer of power. despite
the fact that in toady's world, as previously discussed, such power is limited in its ability
to affect other spheres, like economics. A model needs to present a wide range of
options for action without reference to a single power sphere. Furthermore, such a
model must avoid support for any one of the past leadership styles. Minimalists foster
isolationism, while chaos theories propagate Cold War tendencies of machoism and
conflict. The new model's prime purpose is to guide us through this transitory time
period, rather than jump ahead in an attempt to define America's role in whatever
emerges from this period of change. The Presidential Model serves to guide President
until a new world framework emerges. In other words, the following model is a tool to
be used upon the quest, not the shining light that signifies the completion of the journey.
In the words of Thomas Kuhn: "To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better
than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with
which it can be confronted. 1150 The Presidential Model does not seek to address specific
cases in order to offer solutions, rather it attempts to offer a framework of options that
any case put before the President can evaluated under. Robert Haas states it best: "Case
by-caseism, even if done competently, is simply inadequate.1151

, Thomas S. The Structure ofScientffic Revolutions. (Chicago: University of
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The model casts the United States in the role of President of the World. This is
an intellectual shift from envisioning America as the "leader of the free world,"
defending all from an evil empire. Also, it moves away from the concept that the U. S
merely leads by example, yet it avoids the Monrovian concern that the U.S. might
become "dictatress of the world." The analogy to the President of the United States is
useful in the conception of how the model will explain behavior options for the United
States. For instance, there is a direct analogy between the President of the United States'
veto power over legislation, and the U.S.'s formal veto in the United Nations.
Furthermore, the informal power of the President to influence Congress through the
media and be reflected in the United States' power to affect other countries through their
populace by way of influencing them with American culture. The United State's mix of
power, as expressed through Nye's table, coincide nicely with the decision-making
options presented in the model. The model emphasizes two important characteristics:
adaptiveness and participation, based upon Ron Heifetz's Theory of Adaptive Leadership
and the Vroom-Yerton Normative Model, respectively. A synthesis of both concepts is
the goal of the Presidential Model.
Ron Heifetz sees leadership as an adaptive work which seeks "to diminish the gap
between values people stand for and the reality they face. "52 As a part of this theory,
leaders attempt to clarify what matters most - what are the trade-offs involved in any
given situation. A leader's role is to force the followers to face tough challenges, to make
these trade-offs, to clarify what is really wanted. Important in this process is the
inclusion of various competing values and perspectives in order to allow for a good
amount of reality testing of possible solutions to the difficult challenges facing the leader
and followers. Reality testing forces a solution to be non-imperialistic. Finally, the

52Heifetz, Ron. Leader.r.hip Without Easy Answers. (Cambridge: Harvard University
ress, 1994 ). pg. 22.

response of the leader must be adaptive in nature, meaning the solution faces the
problem, but has also been tested by competing solutions.53

Complimenting nicely this sense of adaptiveness is the Vroom-Yetton Model's

identification of five different decision•procedures for a leader. These different levels of

follower involvement allow an adaptive response to almost any situation faced by the

United States, and it also reveals the false dilemma impose upon foreign policy by the
unilateral-mulitlateral debate. Differing situations demand different levels of

involvement. The levels of involvement proposed by Vroom and Yetton are as follows:

Autocratic I: The problem is solved by the leader lone, based upon information
known at the time.
Autocratic II: The leader obtains the necessary information from the followers,
then decides upon a solution.
Consultation I: The problem is shared with followers individually and suggestions
and opinions are obtained by the leader. However, the leader still
determines the final solution, which may or may not reflect the
followers input.
Consultation II: The problem is shared with the followers as a group and ideas are
gathered by the leader. However, the solution is stil1 determined
by the leader, which may or may not reflect the groups input.
Group II: The problem is shared by the leader to the entire group and a solution is
gained by consensus. 54
These levels of participation by the followers give a definitive framework from

which the leader, meaning the President of the United States, can consult. These levels
allow the United States to explicitly recognize the mixed motive nature of jts foreign

policy. The American principles of democracy, openness. and free market capitalism has

never Jenltitselfto be an imperial power. However, like any other country, the United
States must define and protect its interests.

s, comparing its leadership role to that of a

president, this model helps to alleviate this conflict. Presidents, too, have personal,
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political concerns, but, at the same, time, they must lead their followers to common

goals. Unilateralists err by forcing the U.S. into pursuing its own goals too rigorously,

trampling on the needs of our allied followers. However, multilateralists subvert the

U.S.'s interests too much to the world community. By using the Presidential Model, the
leaders of the United States, depending on the contingency, can choose to lead in a

unilateral style by implementing an Autocratic decision-making process, or they can

determine America's interest's to not be strong enough to disallow maximum

participation at the Group dedsion-making level.

The Presidential Model recognizes two realities presented previously: the

changing characteristics of the world and the changing leadership needed to face them.

The search through stable peace by combining the old ways of thinking with new realities

can be accomplished through the implementation of the Presidential Model. It allows for
the continuance of the role of the President of the United States as ultimate decision

maker, and encourages the use of the National Security Board as a sounding board by

stressing the importance of reality testing. The model allevfate�oeumbersome role of

peacekeeper, allowing the United States to instead act more in concert with other nation
states in resolving conflicts around the world. This helps most in cases such as Bosnia,

where direct American interests are difficult to find. While the role of Cold Warrior may
have died a natural death with the end of the Cold War, the presidential tendency to

display machismo has not. The Presidential Model helps curb this tendency merely by

offering other, adaptive options. Yet. an elimination of this style would be undesirable.

and remains will the Autocratic level of decision making. For example, in the recent

Oklahoma City bombing, when tt was rumored that perhaps it was an international

incident, the President was quite to display his machoismo by stating the terrorist would
be found, wherever they tried to hide in the world.

The model is also responsive to the changing characteristics of the world during

this transitory stage. By avoiding any situational references, the model does not tie down

the United States into thinking militarily when faced with an economic situation. Also,
all the influences upon the world, from the peace interest of nuclear weapons to the
intricacies of haute finance, are reflected in this model Nuclear contingencies can be
faced with a ]ow level of participation, perhaps at the consultation stages, since the
United States is still mainly dealing with a relatively small number of nations with this
issue. However, free-trade issues within the economic sphere would most likely require
the group level of decision-making, as expressed in the conferences held on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Furthermore, this model explicitly recognizes the
United States as the leader of the world, yet it does not present America as a hegemon,
dictator, or enforcer. Other nation-states already reco6rnize this de facto situation, with a
high ranking Japanese official stating "there \vill be no free world and no free trading
system if the United States does not preserve them for us ... The best Japan can aspire to is
;vice-president"'. 55 The concept of the United States as president of the world merely
connotes America as the best candidate for the job, as expressed by power level resources
across the breadth of spheres.

Hugo Grotius provided the world with his framework for world order over three
hundred and fifty years ago. This framework evolved into the current Westphalian state
system. Presently, however, we are not fortunate enough to know what framework of
world order will eventually evolve out of the tremendous changes taking place today.
Furthermore, it is not known whether or not this as yet defined framework will promote
stable peace. The answer to the Grotian question presently must remain unanswered, for
it is impossible to accurately portray with any confident what the world order will be.
However, this does not mean the Grotian Quest cannot be furthered by leaders who are
55Nye, Joseph S., Jc Hound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. (New
York: Basic Books, 1990). pg. I 61.

adaptive in nature. Working through the Presidential Model presented here ,viii move
the United States along the Grotian Path. Eventually, a new world order will emerge, and
the Presidential Model may then have to be replaced with a model more suited for
whatever has emerged. Until that time, the Presidential Model, combining the useful old
leadership styles with the emerging world trends, can guide the United States, and its
President, towards the end of the Grotian Quest and towards stable peace.

